Buyer Guides
Microsoft’s Sovereign Cloud Update Makes External Key Custody an Operating Choice
Microsoft’s October 20 update highlights external KEK custody. Azure retains its service role; customers take on the proxy, HSM and connection dependencies.
In its October 20, 2026 Sovereign Cloud update, Microsoft describes Azure Managed HSM external key management (EKM) as generally available. [1] The enterprise decision is whether external key custody fits a workload that continues using a compatible Azure service.
External key management keeps the key encryption key (KEK) outside Microsoft infrastructure while retaining the Azure service and Managed HSM in the operating path. The buyer must assess that custody arrangement together with the customer-operated proxy and external HSM it depends on. [2]
Trace the stored-data key operation
Microsoft’s overview describes envelope encryption: a data encryption key, or DEK, encrypts the stored data. A key encryption key, or KEK, protects that DEK. Wrapping protects the DEK; unwrapping recovers it for use. With external key management, the KEK stays in the external HSM, a hardware security module. Unwrapping returns the DEK to the Azure service without releasing the KEK. [2]
For Azure Storage, Microsoft traces a required wrap or unwrap call through its Managed HSM key URI. Managed HSM authenticates through Microsoft Entra ID, authorizes through local role-based access control, and uses an external-key reference. The request then passes to the customer-operated EKM Proxy, which translates it for the customer-operated external HSM. The cryptographic result returns through the proxy and Managed HSM. [3]
Managed HSM therefore retains its interface and authorization role. Some requests avoid the external path: GetKey reads use retained metadata without calling the proxy or HSM. [3]
A successful GetKey response alone would not demonstrate that the proxy or external HSM is reachable: that read does not use them. Ask the operating owner for evidence covering the required wrap or unwrap path. This is an inference from the documentation, not a reported test.
One record service, two separate requirements
Consider a fictional enterprise record service that keeps its stored documents in a compatible Azure Storage configuration. The example stipulates that its KEK remains in customer-owned, customer-operated hardware outside Microsoft infrastructure. The enterprise has two independent requirements: physical custody of that KEK, and operation of the whole application locally without the Azure service. This is a conceptual purchasing comparison, with no actual deployment, contract interpretation or security test.
The stipulated placement addresses the KEK-custody requirement. The application still relies on Azure Storage, so operation of the whole application locally remains a separate, unanswered requirement. It needs its own proposed environment and supporting evidence. An on-premises HSM cannot supply that answer for the document service.
Now consider the operating explanation supplied with this fictional offer. It names the external HSM and a Managed HSM key reference, but does not identify who operates the EKM Proxy. Its proposed assurance item covers reading key metadata. Even if that item were substantiated, it would leave the external operation path unexamined. The useful purchasing finding is an unresolved dependency, alongside a stipulated custody placement and an unanswered local-operation requirement.
The follow-up therefore goes to the provider of the external-key arrangement: identify the proxy operator, the HSM operator and the party responsible for their connectivity. Have that explanation connect the offered Azure service’s required key operations to the external components. This fills an operating-scope gap without changing the two original requirements or claiming that the application has passed acceptance.
External custody introduces an operating dependency
A required wrap or unwrap operation fails if its proxy or HSM is unreachable; dependent workloads can be interrupted. [4] This does not establish immediate failure of every application request, whose relationship to key operations remains service-specific.
Microsoft’s FAQ assigns deployment, security, operation and scaling of the proxy to the customer or HSM vendor; Microsoft does not supply it as a supported product. [4] The buying decision consequently includes who will operate that service, maintain its connectivity and certificates, and resolve problems across the Azure and external components.
Use that explanation to assess the proposed service as a whole. It can establish who owns a dependency without proving availability for the application. Keep any claimed interruption or recovery behavior tied to evidence for the actual Azure service and offered arrangement; the key’s location alone supplies neither.
Read the October update by the control it changes
The English FAQ distinguishes EKM’s GA status from its Azure Private Link integration, which remains in preview. It limits the offering to Azure public regions, excluding Azure Government and Azure China. [4] Microsoft’s overview also limits applicability to services supporting customer-managed keys with Managed HSM; the chosen service’s configuration documentation still matters. [2]
For EU/EFTA customers, Data Guardian adds European-resident oversight through a trusted EU partner for qualifying Microsoft-engineer remote access to in-scope production systems. Production Touch Ledger is rolling out in phases in the EU/EFTA, recording that access and actions in tamper-evident form. [1] These controls establish neither universal operator prevention nor sovereignty certification.
Sovereign Control Panel is scheduled to enter public preview at Microsoft Ignite. [1] Its future status means a buyer cannot treat it as an already-GA console.
Finish with the requirement and its remaining dependencies
A platform buyer can now ask a precise question: does the proposed compatible Azure service meet the specified external-KEK custody requirement, and who operates the proxy, HSM and connection on which its required key operations depend? A complete answer names the service scope and operating owners while keeping local application operation open until separately substantiated.
For adjacent questions, the GPU confidential-computing guide distinguishes stored-data and channel encryption from protection during processing, and explains attestation evidence. The disconnected-delivery guide examines local software artifacts and applicable licensing dependencies. Those concerns need their own evidence alongside this key-custody decision.
If the chosen infrastructure also requires equipment receiving, rack integration, onsite installation or cabling, Leviathan’s Complete Physical Infrastructure Deployment service covers a separately agreed physical package. Bring a nonconfidential equipment, site and handoff outline to a physical project inquiry.
01Footnotes
Footnotes
- Microsoft, October 20, 2026: Sovereign Cloud update covering external keys, operator oversight and the planned Control Panel preview. Read October 20, 2026.
- Microsoft Learn, EKM overview, updated October 16, 2026: encryption-at-rest model and compatible-service scope. Read October 20, 2026.
- Microsoft Learn, EKM architecture, updated October 15, 2026: request flow, authorization, metadata reads and external-operation failure boundaries. Read October 20, 2026.
- Microsoft Learn, English EKM FAQ, updated October 16, 2026: GA versus Private Link preview, regional scope and proxy operating responsibilities. Read October 20, 2026.
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